CUNEF Universidad, Spain
IZA World of Labor role
Assistant Professor of Economics at CUNEF Universidad, Spain
Microeconomic theory, mechanism design, matching, migration policy
PhD Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2020
"Collusion-proof and fair auctions." Economics Letters 185 (2019)
"Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices." Journal of Economic Theory 196 (2021) (with Á. Hernando-Veciana).
The combination of tradable quotas and matching would benefit host countries as well as refugeesEver since the major inflow of refugees (the “refugee crisis”) in 2015 and 2016, there has been heated debate about the appropriate distribution of refugees in the EU. Current policies revolve around mandatory quotas, which disregard the preferences of EU members and refugees alike. This problem can be addressed with two market mechanisms. First, tradable quotas minimize the cost of asylum provision for host countries. Second, a matching system gives refugees more discretion over where they are sheltered. While this proposal is theoretically appealing, it has yet to be tested in practice.MoreLess