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Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, and IAE (CSIC), Spain, and IZA, Germany

I think economists should take care of presenting their own results to policymakers and the general public and I am thankful to IZA World of Labor for giving me the opportunity to do so

IZA World of Labor role

Author

Current position

Associate Professor, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain

Research interest

Economics of immigration, labor economics, development economics, international economics

Website

https://economics.uc3m.es/personal/jesus-fernandez-huertas-moraga/

Past positions

Assistant Professor, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain; Researcher, FEDEA, Spain; Researcher, Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC), Spain

Qualifications

PhD Economics, Columbia University, 2007

Selected publications

  • “Rational inattention and migration decisions.” Journal of International Economics 126:103364 (2020): 1–22 (with S. Bertoli and L. Guichard).

  • “Immigrant locations and native residential preferences: Emerging ghettos or new communities?” Journal of Urban Economics 112 (2019): 133–151 (with A. Ferrer and A. Salz).

  • “Tradable immigration quotas.” Journal of Public Economics 115 (2014): 94–108 (with H. Rapoport).

  • “Multilateral resistance to migration.” Journal of Development Economics 102 (2013): 79–100 (with S. Bertoli).

  • “New evidence on emigrant selection.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 93:1 (2011): 72–96.

article(s)

  • Can market mechanisms solve the refugee crisis? Updated

    The combination of tradable quotas and matching would benefit host countries as well as refugees

    Jesús Fernández-Huertas MoragaMartin Hagen, October 2021
    Ever since the major inflow of refugees (the “refugee crisis”) in 2015 and 2016, there has been heated debate about the appropriate distribution of refugees in the EU. Current policies revolve around mandatory quotas, which disregard the preferences of EU members and refugees alike. This problem can be addressed with two market mechanisms. First, tradable quotas minimize the cost of asylum provision for host countries. Second, a matching system gives refugees more discretion over where they are sheltered. While this proposal is theoretically appealing, it has yet to be tested in practice.
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