Aarhus University, Denmark, and IZA, Germany
IZA World of Labor role
Author, Associate Editor
Professor of Economics, Aarhus University, Denmark
Labor economics, public economics, the economics of the welfare state
Positions/functions as a policy advisor
Extensive involvement in policy advising in Denmark and various other countries and the EU Commission. Past activities include: Former chairman of the Danish Council of Economic Advisors and the Danish Welfare Commission. Former member of the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council, and commissions appointed by the governments of Norway and Greenland
PhD, Université Catholique, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1986
“On myopia as a rationale for social security.” Economic Theory 47:1 (2011): 135–158 (with J. Bhattacharya).
“Increasing longevity and social security reforms—A legislative procedure approach.” Journal of Public Economics 92:3–4 (2009): 633–646.
“International interdependencies in fiscal stabilization policies.” European Economic Review 50:5 (2006): 1169–1195 (with M. Spange).
“International transmission of transitory and persistent monetary shocks under imperfect information.” Journal of International Economics 66:2 (2005): 485–507 (with N. C. Beier).
“Nominal and real propagation of nominal shocks.” Economic Journal 114 (2004): 174–195.
Long-term unemployment did not rise under the flexicurity model during the great recession, despite the large drop in GDPTorben M. Andersen, July 2015Before the great recession of 2008–2009, the “flexicurity” model (with flexibility for firms to adjust their labor force along with income security for workers through the social safety net) attracted attention for its ability to deliver low unemployment. But how did it fare during the recession, especially in Denmark, which has been highlighted as having a well-functioning flexicurity model? Flexible hiring and firing rules are expected to lead to large adjustments in employment in a recession. Did the high rate of job turnover continue or did long-term unemployment rise? And did the social safety net become overburdened?MoreLess
Unemployment insurance generosity should be greater when unemployment is high—and vice versaTorben M. Andersen, May 2014High unemployment and its social and economic consequences have lent urgency to the question of how to improve unemployment insurance in bad times without jeopardizing incentives to work or public finances in the medium term. A possible solution is a rule-based system that improves the generosity of unemployment insurance (replacement rate, benefit duration, eligibility conditions) when unemployment is high and reduces the generosity when it is low.MoreLess