Temple University, USA, and IZA, Germany
IZA World of Labor role
Author, Topic spokesperson
Professor of Economics at Temple University, USA
Personnel economics, executive pay, promotion, and incentives
Director of Economics and Business at Temple University, Japan; Chair of the Department of Economics, Temple University, USA
PhD Labor Economics, Cornell University, 1990
"High-powered performance pay and crowding out of nonmonetary motives." Management Science 64:10 (2018): 4471–4965 (with D. Huffman).
"Promotion determinants in corporate hierarchies: An examination of fast tracks and functional area." In: Research in Labor Economics Volume 46. Bingley: Emerald Insight, 2018 (with C. Belzil and F. Poinas).
"Promotion signals, experience and education." Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 25:1 (2016): 111–132 (with E. Melero).
"Promotions, demotions, halo effects, and the earnings dynamics of American executives." Journal of Labor Economics 26:2 (2008): 287–310 (with C. Belzil).
Efficient markets, managerial power, and CEO compensation Updated
CEO pay, often contentious, is the product of many forcesMichael L. Bognanno, February 2019The escalation in chief executive officer (CEO) pay over recent decades, both in absolute terms and in relation to the earnings of production workers, has generated considerable attention. The pay of top executives has grown noticeably in relation to overall firm profitability. The pay gap between CEOs in the US and those in other developed countries narrowed substantially during the 2000s, making top executive pay an international concern. Researchers have taken positions on both sides of the debate over whether the level of CEO pay is economically justified or is the result of managerial power.MoreLess