Temple University, USA, and IZA, Germany
IZA World of Labor role
Author, Topic spokesperson
Associate Professor of Economics at Temple University, USA
Personnel economics, executive pay, promotion, and incentives
Director of Economics and Business at Temple University, Japan; Chair of the Department of Economics, Temple University, USA
PhD Labor Economics, Cornell University, 1990
"Do tournaments have incentive effects?" Journal of Political Economy 98:6 (1990): 1307–1324 (with R. G. Ehrenberg).
"International differences in executive and managerial compensation.” In: Differences and Changes in Wage Structures. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995; pp. 67–104 (with J. M. Abowd).
"Corporate tournaments." Journal of Labor Economics 19:2 (2001): 290–315."Promotions, demotions, halo effects, and the earnings dynamics of American executives." Journal of Labor Economics 26:2 (2008): 287–310 (with C. Belzil).
“The promotion dynamics of American executives.” In Polachek, S. W., and K. Tatsiramos (eds). Jobs, Training, and Worker Well-Being (Research in Labor Economics, Volume 30). Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2010; pp. 189–231 (with C. Belzil).
CEO pay, often contentious, is the product of many forcesMichael L. Bognanno, August 2014The escalation in chief executive officer (CEO) pay over recent decades, both in absolute terms and in relation to the earnings of production workers, has generated considerable attention. The pay of top executives has grown noticeably in relation to overall firm profitability. The pay gap between CEOs in the US and those in other developed countries narrowed substantially during the 2000s, making top executive pay an international concern. Researchers have taken positions on both sides of the debate over whether the level of CEO pay is economically justified or is the result of managerial power.MoreLess