University of California, Santa Barbara, USA, and IZA, Germany
IZA World of Labor role
Professor, Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA
Behavioral game theory, experimental labor economics, communication, contract design, field interventions, and individual decision making
PhD Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 1996
“Letting down the team? Evidence of social effects of team incentives.” Journal of the European Economic Association 13:5 (2015): 841–870 (with P. Babcock, K. Bedard, J. Hartman, and H. Royer).
“Merit pay and wage compression with productivity differences and uncertainty.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 117 (2015): 233–247 (with T. Gross and C. Guo).
“Inducing norms in laboratory allocation choices.” Management Science 61:7 (2015): 1531–1546 (with A. Schram).
“Continuous time and communication in a public-goods experiment.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 108 (2014): 212–223 (with R. Oprea and D. Friedman).
“Experimental games on networks: Underpinnings of behavior and equilibrium selection.” Econometrica 82:5 (2014): 1615–1670 (with F. Feri, M. Meléndez-Jiménez, and M. Sutter).
Delegating the choice of wage setting to workers can lead to better outcomes for all involved partiesGary B. Charness, January 2016Economists typically predict that people are inherently selfish; however, experimental evidence suggests that this is often not the case. In particular, delegating a choice (such as a wage) to the performing party may imbue this party with a sense of responsibility, leading to improved outcomes for both the delegating entity and the performing party. This strategy can be risky, as some people will still choose to act in a selfish manner, causing adverse consequences for productivity and earnings. An important issue to consider is therefore how to encourage a sense of responsibility in the performing party.MoreLess