University of Sydney, Australia
IZA World of Labor role
Professor, University of Sydney, Australia
Organizational economics, industrial organization
PhD Economics, Australian National University, 2002
The Essentials of Microeconomics. London: Routledge, 2015 (with B. Nguyen).
“The evolving nature of the college wage premium.” Economic Modelling 93 (2020): 474–479 (with O. Birulin and V. Smirov).
"Worker trust in management and delegation in organizations." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (Forthcoming) (with K. Meagher).
"Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture." Games and Economic Behavior 118 (2019): 354–365 (with J. Newton and S. D. Simon).
"Authority and communication in firms." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 155 (2018): 315–348 (with H. Katayama and K. Meagher).
Employee trust in their managers allows a firm to delegate decision-making, aiding both productivity and profitabilityIt is not possible for a formal employment contract to detail everything an employee should do and when. Informal relationships, in particular trust, allow managers to arrange a business in a more productive way; high-trust firms are both more profitable and faster growing. For example, if they are trusted, managers can delegate decisions to employees with confidence that employees will believe the promised rewards. This is important because employees are often better informed than their bosses. Consequently, firms that rely solely on formal contracts will miss profitable opportunities.MoreLess