EHESS and AMSE, France
IZA World of Labor role
Research Professor, L'École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)
Income distribution, inequality measurement, inequality of opportunity redistribution, taxation, voting, public economics
Positions/functions as a policy advisor
Member of the French council of economic advisors to the French Prime Minister 2012–2016; Scientific advisor of the think tank "France Stratégie" since 2007. This think tank advises the French prime minister
Professor of Economics, University of Cergy-Pontoise, 1991–2002; Professor of Economics, University of Rennes, 1988–1991
"Docteur d'Etat" Economics, Université de Rennes, 1987
"Customer discrimination and employment outcomes: Theory and evidence from the French labor market." Journal of Labor Economics 34:1 (2016): 107–160 (with P. Combes, B. Decreuse, and M. Laouénan).
"Even (mixed) risk lovers are prudent." American Economic Review 103:4 (2013): 1529–1535 (with D. Crainich and L. Eckhoud).
"Equality of opportunity: Theory and measurement." Journal of Economic Literature 54:4 (2016): 1288–1332 (with J. E. Roemer).
“Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection.” Rand Journal of Economics 46:3 (2015): 546–576 (with R. Gary-Bobo).
“Equality of opportunity and luck: Definitions and testable conditions, with an application to income in France." Journal of Public Economics 93:11–12 (2009): 1189–1208 (with A. Lefranc and N. Pistolesi).
Is high-skilled migration harmful to tax systems’ progressivity?
Understanding how migration responds to tax changes will aid in setting the progressivity of a tax systemLaurent SimulaAlain Trannoy, February 2018Decreased transportation costs have led to the transmission of ideas and values across national borders that has helped reduce the barriers to international labor mobility. In this context, high-skilled individuals are more likely to vote with their feet in response to high income taxes. It is thus important to examine the magnitude of tax-driven migration responses in developed countries as well as the possible consequences of income tax competition between nation states. More specifically, how does the potential threat of migration affect a country’s optimal income tax policies?MoreLess