Utrecht University, the Netherlands, and IZA, Germany
IZA World of Labor role
Professor of Applied Econometrics, Utrecht University, the Netherlands
Econometrics, labor economics, health economics, housing markets
Positions/functions as a policy advisor
Member of CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis; Senior Policy Advisor to the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
Associate Professor of Economics, Utrecht University, the Netherlands (2006–2010); Researcher, CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis, the Netherlands (1998–2001)
PhD Economics, VU University of Amsterdam, 1996
"Do financial bonuses reduce employee absenteeism? Evidence from a lottery." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 62:3 (2009): 327–342 (with P. Koning).
“Time-bound opportunity costs of informal care: Consequences for access to professional care, caregiver support, and labour supply estimates.” Social Science & Medicine 73:10 (2011): 1508–1516 (with B. van den Berg).
“Multiple glass ceilings.” Industrial Relations 51:4 (2012): 892–915 (with G. Russo).
“The impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on firm entry and performance in Turkey.” The World Bank Economic Review 32:1 (2018): 19–40 (with Y.E. Agkündüz and M. van den Berg).
“Do firms with low disability risks opt out from public to private insurance? The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 8:1 (2018) (with P. Koning and W. Zwinkels).
Financial incentives and changes in working conditions are key to many broad and tailor-made programsWolter Hassink, September 2018Do workplace programs help reduce worker sickness absence? Many programs are based on the principle that the employee’s decision to report an absence can be influenced if it is costly to be absent. Firms can reduce absenteeism by implementing broad programs, including performance pay, general improvements of working conditions, and strengthening workers’ loyalty to the firm. Specific programs, such as grading partial absence, seem to be effective at reducing long-term absences. However, firms will be less inclined to implement such programs if they can shift the financial burden to social security programs.MoreLess