Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Spain
IZA World of Labor role
Author
Current position
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
Research interest
Microeconometrics, labor economics, social security, retirement, and health economics
Positions/functions as a policy advisor
Associate Researcher, Fedea, Madrid, Spain; External Consultant, World Bank, Washington, DC, USA
Past positions
Associate Professor of Economics, Universidad Carlos III in Madrid, Spain
Qualifications
PhD Economics, Universidad Pompeu Fabra, 1994
Selected publications
-
“Retirement incentives, individual heterogeneity and labour transitions of employed and unemployed workers.” Labour Economics, 20 (2013): 106–120 (with J. I. García-Pérez and A. Sánchez-Martín).
-
“An evaluation of the life-cycle effects of minimum pensions on retirement behaviour.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 22:5 (2007): 923–950 (with A. Sánchez-Martín).
-
“Latent class versus two-part models in the demand for physician services across the European Union.” Health Economics 11 (2002): 301–321 (with J. M. Labeaga and M. Martínez-Granado).
-
“Social security and retirement in Spain.” In: Gruber, J., and D. Wise (eds). Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999 (with M. Boldrin and F. Peracchi).
-
“Controlling for endogeneity of strike variables in the estimation of wage settlement equations.” Journal of Labor Economics (July 1999).
-
The incentive effects of minimum pensions
Minimum pension programs reduce poverty in old age but they can also reduce the labor supply of low-income workers
Sergi Jiménez-Martín, August 2014The main purpose of minimum pension benefit programs and old-age social assistance programs is to guarantee a minimum standard of living after retirement and thus to alleviate poverty in old age. In many developing and developed countries, the minimum pension program is a key welfare program and a major influence on the retirement decisions of low-income workers and workers with erratic work histories. The design of many minimum pension programs tends to create strong incentives for low-income workers to retire as soon as they become eligible for the program, which is often earlier than the normal retirement age.MoreLess