Florida State University, USA, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, and IZA, Germany
IZA World of Labor role
Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA
Experimental economics, behavioral economics, labor economics, law and public economics, personnel economics
Dr. rer. pol., University of Bonn, 2010
“Fusing enacted and expected mimicry generates a winning strategy that promotes the evolution of cooperation.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110:25 (2013): 10229−10233 (with I. Fischer, A. Frid, S. Levin, D. Rubenstein, and R. Selten).
“Treating equals unequally—Incentives, motivation and production technology in teams.” Journal of Labor Economics 28 (2010): 747−772 (with S. Kube and R. Zultan).
“On the prevalence of framing effects across subject-pools in a two-person cooperation game.” Journal of Economic Psychology 31 (2010): 849−859 (with G. Walkowitz).
“Experimental investigation of a cyclic duopoly game.” Experimental Economics 12:3 (2009): 253−271 (with R. Selten).
Individual work goals can increase a worker’s performance, but they need to be chosen wiselySebastian J. Goerg, August 2015Employers want motivated and productive employees. Are there ways to increase employee motivation without relying solely on monetary incentives, such as pay-for-performance schemes? One tool that has shown promise in recent decades for improving worker performance is setting goals, whether they are assigned by management or self-chosen. Goals are powerful motivators for workers, with the potential for boosting productivity in an organization. However, if not chosen carefully or if used in unsuitable situations, goals can have undesired and harmful consequences. Goals are a powerful tool that needs to be applied with caution.MoreLess