Case Western Reserve University, USA; Economic Science Institute, USA
IZA World of Labor role
Author
Current position
Assistant Professor of Economics, Case Western Reserve University
Research interest
Experimental and behavioral economics, conflict and conflict resolution, game theory, industrial organization, public economics, labor economics
Positions/functions as a policy advisor
Consultant, Alumni Fund Ukraine; Consultant, Smithsonian Institution
Past positions
Associate Professor of Economics, Chapman University
Qualifications
PhD Economics, Purdue University, 2009
Selected publications
-
“Principal-agent settings with random shocks.” Management Science 62 (2016): 985–999 (with J. Rubin).
-
“Overbidding and heterogeneous behavior in contest experiments.” Journal of Economic Surveys 27 (2013): 491–514.
-
“Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games.” Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012): 26–43 (with T. Cason and J. Zhang).
-
“Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study.” Journal of Public Economics 94 (2010): 604–611 (with T. Cason and W. Masters).
-
“Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests.” Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2010): 731–747.
-
The pros and cons of workplace tournaments
Tournaments can outperform other compensation schemes such as piece-rate and fixed wage contracts
Roman M. Sheremeta, October 2016Tournaments are commonly used in the workplace to determine promotion, assign bonuses, and motivate personal development. Tournament-based contracts can be very effective in eliciting high effort, often outperforming other compensation contracts, but they can also have negative consequences for both managers and workers. The benefits and disadvantages of workplace tournaments have been identified in an explosion of theoretical, empirical, and experimental research over the past 30 years. Based on these findings, suggestions and guidelines can be provided for when it might be beneficial to use tournaments in the workplace.MoreLess