Case Western Reserve University, USA; Economic Science Institute, USA
IZA World of Labor role
Assistant Professor of Economics, Case Western Reserve University
Experimental and behavioral economics, conflict and conflict resolution, game theory, industrial organization, public economics, labor economics
Positions/functions as a policy advisor
Consultant, Alumni Fund Ukraine; Consultant, Smithsonian Institution
Associate Professor of Economics, Chapman University
PhD Economics, Purdue University, 2009
“Principal-agent settings with random shocks.” Management Science 62 (2016): 985–999 (with J. Rubin).
“Overbidding and heterogeneous behavior in contest experiments.” Journal of Economic Surveys 27 (2013): 491–514.
“Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games.” Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012): 26–43 (with T. Cason and J. Zhang).
“Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study.” Journal of Public Economics 94 (2010): 604–611 (with T. Cason and W. Masters).
“Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests.” Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2010): 731–747.
Tournaments can outperform other compensation schemes such as piece-rate and fixed wage contractsRoman M. Sheremeta, October 2016Tournaments are commonly used in the workplace to determine promotion, assign bonuses, and motivate personal development. Tournament-based contracts can be very effective in eliciting high effort, often outperforming other compensation contracts, but they can also have negative consequences for both managers and workers. The benefits and disadvantages of workplace tournaments have been identified in an explosion of theoretical, empirical, and experimental research over the past 30 years. Based on these findings, suggestions and guidelines can be provided for when it might be beneficial to use tournaments in the workplace.MoreLess