Leiden University and VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and IZA, Germany
IZA World of Labor role
Professor on Welfare State and the Labor Market, VU University Amsterdam, Department of Economics, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Associate Professor Economics at Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
Labor economics, health and work, applied microeconometrics, disability insurance, welfare-to-work programs, public sector performance and incentives
Positions/functions as a policy advisor
Chief Science Officer, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (July 2011–November 2015)
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, employed in various positions (October 1998–June 2011): Program Leader Public Organization (March 2006–September 2007 and April 2008–June 2011); Program Leader Labor Economics (August 2005–March 2006); Researcher Competition and Regulation unit (March 2002–July 2005); Researcher Labor unit (October 1998–February 2002)
PhD Economics, VU University Amsterdam, 1998
“The rise and fall of disability enrolment in the Netherlands.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 29:2 (2015): 151–172 (with M. Lindeboom).
“The impact of scoring weights on price and quality outcomes: An application to the procurement of welfare-to-work contracts.” European Economic Review 71 (2014): 1–14 (with A. van de Meerendonk).
“Ranking the schools: How school-quality information affects school choice in the Netherlands.” Journal of the European Economic Association 11:2 (2013): 466–493 (with K. van der Wiel).
“Why are criminals less educated than non-criminals?” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 29:1 (2013): 115–144 (with D. Webbink, S. Vujić, and N. Martin).
“The effects of home ownership on labour mobility in the Netherlands.” Journal of Urban Economics 55:3 (2004): 580–596 (M. van Leuvensteijn).
Employer provision of sickness/disability benefits reduces take-up but may also have unintended effectsPierre Koning, December 2016Public schemes for sickness benefits and disability insurance are often criticized for the lack of incentive they provide for preventive and reintegration activities by employers. To stimulate the interest of employers in engaging with these schemes, several modes of privatization could be considered, including the provision of sickness benefits by employers, “experience rating” of disability insurance costs, employer self-insurance, or insurance by private insurance providers. These types of employer incentives seem to lower sickness rates, but they also come at the risk of increased under-reporting and less employment opportunities for workers with disabilities or bad health conditions. Policymakers should be aware of this trade-off.MoreLess