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Kurt Lavetti

Ohio State University, USA, and IZA, Germany

IZA World of Labor is creating an invaluable resource that connects policymakers with the frontier of research in labor economics in an accessible format. I'm honored to help contribute to this series

IZA World of Labor role

Author

Current position

Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Ohio State University, USA

Research interest

Health and labor economics

Website

http://kurtlavetti.com/

Past positions

Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Ohio State University (2013–2019); Robert Wood Johnson Scholar in Health Policy, University of California, Berkeley (2011–2013)

Qualifications

PhD Economics, Cornell University, 2011

Selected publications

  • "Physician practice organization and negotiated prices: Evidence from state law changes." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 13:2 (2021): 258–296 (with N. Hausman).

  • "The impacts of restricting mobility of skilled service workers: Evidence from physicians.” Journal of Human Resources 55:3 (2020) (with C. Simon and W. D. White).

  • “The estimation of compensating wage differentials: Lessons from the deadliest catch.” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 38:1 (2020).

  • "Strategic formulary design in Medicare Part D Plans." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 10:3 (2018) (with K. Simon).

article(s)

  • Noncompete agreements in employment contracts

    Can regulation ensure that noncompete agreements benefit both workers and firms?

    Kurt Lavetti , September 2021
    Labor market institutions that may weaken workers’ bargaining leverage have received increased scrutiny in recent years. One example is noncompete agreements, which prevent workers from freely moving across employers, potentially weakening earnings growth. New data sources and empirical evidence have led policymakers to consider sharp restrictions on their use, especially among lower-income workers. These restrictions take many different forms, each of which has unique tradeoffs between the desire to protect workers while allowing firms to use noncompetes in cases where they may create social value.
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