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Erich Battistin

Queen Mary University of London, UK, and IZA, Germany

IZA World of Labor role

Author

Current position

Professor of Economics, Queen Mary University of London, UK

Research interest

Impact evaluation, economics of education, measurement error

Website

https://www.iza.org/person/7588/erich-battistin

Past positions

Associate Professor of Econometrics, University of Padua (09/2006–12/2013); Assistant Professor of Econometrics, University of Padua (09/2004–08/2006 ); Research Economist, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London (10/2001–08/2006)

Qualifications

PhD Statistics, University of Padua, 2002

Selected publications

  • “Misreported schooling, multiple measures and returns to educational qualifications.” Journal of Econometrics 181:2 (2014): 136–150 (with M. De Nadai and B. Sianesi).

  • “Food and cash transfers: Evidence from Colombia.” Economic Journal 122:559 (2012): 92–124 (with O. Attanasio and A. Mesnard).

  • “Misclassified treatment status and treatment effects: An application to returns to education in the UK.” Review of Economics and Statistics 93:2 (2011): 495–509 (with B. Sianesi).

  • “Providing employers with incentives to train low-skilled employees: Evidence from the UK employer training pilots.” Journal of Labor Economics 29:1 (2011): 153–192 (with L. Abramovsky, E. Fitzsimons, A. Goodman, and H. Simpson).

  • “Why do subsidised firms survive longer? An evaluation of a program promoting youth entrepreneurship in Italy.” In: Lechner, M., and F. Pfeiffer (eds). Econometric Evaluation of Labour Market Policies. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2001 (with A. Gavosto and E. Rettore).

article(s)

  • How manipulating test scores affects school accountability and student achievement

    Standardized testing can create incentives to manipulate test results and generate misleading indicators for public policy

    Erich Battistin, September 2016
    Standardized testing has become the accepted means of measuring a school’s quality. However, the associated rise in test-based accountability creates incentives for schools, teachers, and students to manipulate test scores. Illicit behavior may also occur in institutional settings where performance standards are weak. These issues are important because inaccurate measurement of student achievement leads to poor or ineffective policy conclusions. The consequences of mismeasured student achievement for policy conclusions have been documented in many institutional contexts in Europe and North America, and guidelines can be devised for the future.
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