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Carlos Lamarche

University of Kentucky, USA, and IZA, Germany

IZA World of Labor role

Author

Current position

Gatton Endowed Associate Professor of Economics, University of Kentucky, USA

Research interest

Econometrics, labor economics, microeconomic development, and empirical industrial organization

Website

https://www.carloslamarche.com/

Past positions

Associate Professor of Economics, University of Kentucky, 2012–2015; Chong K. Liew Associate Professor of Economics (on leave), University of Oklahoma, 2012–2013; Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Oklahoma, 2006–2012

Qualifications

PhD Economics, University of Illinois, 2006

Selected publications

  • “Estimating and testing a quantile regression model with interactive effects.” Journal of Econometrics 178:1 (2014): 101–113 (with M. Harding).

  • “Estimation of censored quantile regression for panel data with fixed effects.” Journal of the American Statistical Association: Theory and Methods 108:503 (2013): 1075–1089 (with A. Galvao and L. Lima).

  • “Measuring the incentives to learn in Colombia using new quantile regression approaches.” Journal of Development Economics 96 (2011): 278–288.

  • “Robust penalized quantile regression estimation for panel data.” Journal of Econometrics 157 (2010): 396–408.

  • “The effect of information on the bidding and survival of entrants in procurement auctions.” Journal of Public Economics 93 (2009): 56–72 (with D. De Silva and G. Kosmopoulou).

article(s)

  • Collective bargaining in developing countries

    Negotiating work rules at the firm level instead of the industry level could lead to productivity gains

    Carlos Lamarche, September 2015
    Because theoretical arguments differ on the economic impact of collective bargaining agreements in developing countries, empirical studies are needed to provide greater clarity. Recent empirical studies for some Latin American countries have examined whether industry- or firm-level collective bargaining is more advantageous for productivity growth. Although differences in labor market institutions and in coverage of collective bargaining agreements limit the generalizability of the findings, studies suggest that work rules may raise productivity when negotiated at the firm level but may sometimes lower productivity when negotiated at the industry level.
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