The Hebrew University, Jerusalem
IZA World of Labor role
Associate Professor, The Jerusalem School of Business Administration, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Psychology and economics, decision making under uncertainty, applied microeconomic theory
Positions/functions as a policy advisor
Economist, Research Department, The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 2009–2014
Senior Economist, Research Department, The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, USA (2014–2020); Visiting Scholar, Economics Department, Harvard University (2016–2017); Assistant Professor, The Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University (2006–2009)
PhD Economics, Yale University, 2005
"Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and monetary incentives in behaving prosocially." American Economic Review 99:1 (2009): 544–555 (with D. Ariely and S. Meier).
"Affective decision-making: A theory of optimism bias." Games and Economic Behavior 75:1 (2012): 67–80 (with D. Brown).
"Relative pay and labor supply." Journal of Labor Economics 33:2 (2015): 297–315 (with U. Gneezy and G. Loewenstein).
"Competitive incentives: Working harder or working smarter?" Management Science 59 (2013): 771–781 (with C. Fershtman).
"Mixed signals: Charity reporting when donations signal generosity and income." Games and Economic Behavior 104 (2017): 24–42 (with L. Vesterlund).
Comparisons to others’ pay and to one’s own past earnings can affect willingness to work and effort on the jobAnat Bracha, June 2017Recent studies show that even irrelevant relative pay information—earnings compared to the past or to others—significantly affects workers’ willingness to work (labor supply) and effort. This effect stems mainly from those whose pay compares unfavorably; accordingly, earning less compared to others or less than in the past significantly reduces one’s willingness to work and effort exerted on the job. Comparing favorably, however, has mixed effects—with usually no effect on effort, but positive or no effects on labor supply. Understanding when relative pay increases labor supply and effort can thus help firms devise optimal payment structures.MoreLess