California State University East Bay, USA
Compensation, Promotions, Incentives, Sick leave, Wage theft
English - Native speaker
Wang Family Professor, and Department Chair, Department of Economics, California State University East Bay, USA
Positions/functions as a policy advisor
Senior Fellow, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy
Assistant Professor of Labor Economics, Cornell University, USA
PhD, Stanford University, 2002
“An ‘opposing responses’ test of classic versus market-based promotion tournaments.” Journal of Labor Economics (Forthcoming) (with A. Kauhanen).
“Strategic shirking: A theoretical analysis of multitasking and specialization.” International Economic Review (Forthcoming) (with O. Gürtler).
“Internal promotion and external recruitment: A theoretical and empirical analysis.” Journal of Labor Economics 31:2 (2013): 227–269 (with H. Morita).
“The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence.” Journal of Labor Economics 30:1 (2012): 91–147 (with M. Waldman).
“Internal promotion competitions in firms.” RAND Journal of Economics 37:3 (2006): 521–542.
The efficacy of internal or external hiring hinges on other policies that a firm uses simultaneouslyJed DeVaro, February 2016Hiring is one of a firm’s most important decisions. When an employer fills a vacancy with one of its own workers (through promotion or lateral transfer), it forgoes the opportunity to fill the position with a new hire from outside the firm. Although both internal and external hiring methods are used, firms frequently have a bias favoring insiders. Internal and external hires differ in observable characteristics (such as skill levels), as do the employers making each type of hiring decision. Understanding those differences helps employers design and manage hiring policies that are appropriate for their organizations.MoreLess