California State University East Bay, USA
Compensation, Promotions, Incentives, Sick leave, Wage theft
English - Native speaker
The Wang Family Professor, and Department Chair, Department of Economics, California State University East Bay, USA
Positions/functions as a policy advisor
Senior Fellow, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy
Assistant Professor of Labor Economics, Cornell University, USA
PhD, Stanford University, 2002
“An ‘opposing responses’ test of classic versus market-based promotion tournaments.” Journal of Labor Economics 34:3 (2016): 747–779 (with A. Kauhanen).
“Strategic shirking: A theoretical analysis of multitasking and specialization.” International Economic Review 57:2 (2016): 507–532 (with O. Gürtler).
“Internal promotion and external recruitment: A theoretical and empirical analysis.” Journal of Labor Economics 31:2 (2013): 227–269 (with H. Morita).
“The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence.” Journal of Labor Economics 30:1 (2012): 91–147 (with M. Waldman).
“Internal promotion competitions in firms.” RAND Journal of Economics 37:3 (2006): 521–542.
The efficacy of hiring strategies hinges on a firm’s simultaneous use of other policiesJed DeVaro, May 2020When an employer fills a vacancy with one of its own workers (through promotion or horizontal transfer), it forgoes the opportunity to fill the position with a new hire from outside the firm. Although firms use both internal and external hiring methods, they frequently favor insiders. Internal and external hires differ in observable characteristics (such as skill levels), as do the employers making the hiring decisions. Understanding those differences helps employers design and manage hiring policies that are appropriate for their organizations.MoreLess