Sciences Po, France, and IZA, Germany
Professor of Economics, Sciences Po, France
Labor economics, macroeconomics
Positions/functions as a policy advisor
Member of Conseil d’Analyse Economique (Adv. council of the PM, 2006–2010; 2012–present); Member of the Commission Economique de la Nation (Adv. council of the Minister of Economics and Finance, 2005–2009)
Professor of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique, France (2007–2018); Professor of Economics, ENSAE, France (2011–2018)
PhD Economics, University Paris 1, 1989
“Inherited trust and growth.” American Economic Review 100 (2010): 2060–2092 (with Y. Algan).
“Regulation and distrust.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125:3 (2010): 1015–1049 (with P. Aghion, Y. Algan, and A. Shleifer).
“A theory of wages and labor demand with intrafirm bargaining and matching frictions.” International Economic Review 48:3 (2008): 943–972 (with F. Marque and E. Wasmer).
“Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: A structural econometric model.” Econometrica 74:2 (2006): 323–364 (with F. Postel-Vinay and J.-M. Robin).
Labor Economics. MIT Press, 2004 (with A. Zylberberg). Also published in Chinese by Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Press, 2007.
Temporary government schemes can have a positive economic effectPierre Cahuc, May 2019Government schemes that compensate workers for the loss of income while they are on short hours (known as short-time work compensation schemes) make it easier for employers to temporarily reduce hours worked so that labor is better matched to output requirements. Because the employers do not lay off these staff, the schemes help to maintain permanent employment levels during recessions. However, they can create inefficiency in the labor market, and might limit labor market access for freelancers and those looking to work part-time.MoreLess