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References for Unemployment benefits and job match quality
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Further reading
- Atkinson, A. B., Micklewright, J. "Unemployment compensation and labor market transitions: A critical review" Journal of Economic Literature 29 (1991): 1679–1727.
- Fredriksson, P., Holmlund, B. "Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research" Journal of Economic Surveys 20 (2006): 357–386.
- Karni, E. "Optimal unemployment insurance: A survey" Southern Economic Journal 66 (1999): 442–465.
- Tatsiramos, K., van Ours, J. C. "Labor market effects of unemployment insurance design" Journal of Economic Surveys 28 (2014): 284–311.
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Key references
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Chetty, R. "Moral hazard vs.
liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance" Journal of
Political Economy 116 (2008): 173–234. Key reference: [1]
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Card, D., Chetty, R., Weber, A. "Cash-on-hand and
competing models of intertemporal behavior: New evidence from
the labor market" Quarterly Journal
of Economics 122 (2007): 1511–1560. Key reference: [2]
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Ehrenberg, R. G., Oaxaca, R. L. "Unemployment
insurance, duration of unemployment, and subsequent wage
gain" American Economic
Review 66 (1976): 754–766. Key reference: [3]
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Addison, J. T., Blackburn, M. L. "The effects of
unemployment insurance on post-unemployment earnings" Labour
Economics 7 (2000): 21–53. Key reference: [4]
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Belzil, C. "Unemployment
insurance and subsequent job duration: Job matching vs.
unobserved heterogeneity" Journal of Applied
Econometrics 16 (2001): 619–633. Key reference: [5]
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Centeno, M. "The match quality
gains from unemployment insurance" Journal of Human
Resources 34 (2004): 839–863. Key reference: [6]
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Tatsiramos, K. "Unemployment
insurance in Europe: Unemployment duration and subsequent
employment stability" Journal of the
European Economic Association 7 (2009): 1225–1260. Key reference: [7]
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Lalive, R. "Unemployment
benefits, duration and post-unemployment jobs" American Economic
Review 97:2 (2007): 108–112. Key reference: [8]
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van Ours, J. C., Vodopivec, M. "Does reducing
unemployment insurance generosity reduce job match
quality?" Journal of Public
Economics 92 (2008): 684–695. Key reference: [9]
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Caliendo, M., Tatsiramos, K., Uhlendorff, A. "Benefits duration,
unemployment duration and job match quality: A regression
discontinuity approach" Journal of Applied
Econometrics 28 (2013): 604–627. Key reference: [10]
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Chetty, R. "Moral hazard vs.
liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance" Journal of
Political Economy 116 (2008): 173–234.
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Additional References
- Acemoglu, D., Shimer, R. "Efficient unemployment insurance" Journal of Political Economy 107:5 (1999): 893–928.
- Marimon, R., Zilibotti, F. "Unemployment vs. mismatch of talents: Reconsidering unemployment benefits" Economic Journal 109:455 (1999): 266–291.
- Michaillat, P. "Do matching frictions explain unemployment? Not in bad times" American Economic Review 102:4 (2012): 1721–1750.