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References for The pros and cons of workplace tournaments
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Further reading
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Key references
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Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., Sheremeta, R. M. "A survey of experimental research on
contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments" Experimental Economics 18 (2015): 609–669. Key reference: [1]
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Lazear, E. P., Rosen, S. "Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor
contracts" Journal of Political Economy 89 (1981): 841–864. Key reference: [2]
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Konrad, K. A. Strategy and Dynamics in Contests. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Key reference: [3]
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Connelly, B. L., Tihanyi, L., Crook, T. R., Gangloff, K. A. "Tournament theory thirty years of contests
and competitions" Journal of Management 40 (2014): 16–47. Key reference: [4]
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Sheremeta, R. M. "Overbidding and heterogeneous behavior in
contest experiments" Journal of Economic Surveys 27 (2013): 491–514. Key reference: [5]
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Sheremeta, R. M. Impulsive Behavior in Competition: Testing
Theories of Overbidding in Rent-seeking Contests Working Paper, 2016. Key reference: [6]
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Sheremeta, R. M. "Experimental comparison of multi-stage and
one-stage contests" Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2010): 731–747. Key reference: [7]
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Dohmen, T., Falk, A. "Performance pay and multidimensional
sorting: Productivity, preferences, and gender" American Economic Review 101 (2011): 556–590. Key reference: [8]
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Frank, R., Cook, P. The Winner-Take-All Society. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Key reference: [9]
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Drago, R., Garvey, G. T. "Incentives for helping on the job: Theory
and evidence" Journal of Labor Economics 16 (1998): 1–25. Key reference: [10]
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Carpenter, J., Matthews, P., Schirm, J. "Tournaments and office politics: Evidence
from a real effort experiment" American Economic Review 100 (2010): 504–517. Key reference: [11]
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Niederle, M., Vesterlund, L. "Do women shy away from competition? Do men
compete too much?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (2007): 1067–1101. Key reference: [12]
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Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., Sheremeta, R. M. "A survey of experimental research on
contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments" Experimental Economics 18 (2015): 609–669.
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Additional References
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- Baker, G. P. "Incentive contracts and performance measurement" Journal of Political Economy 100 (1992): 598–614.
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- Balafoutas, L., Sutter, M. "Affirmative action policies promote women and do not harm efficiency in the laboratory" Science 335 (2012): 579–582.
- Becker, B. E., Huselid, M. A. "The incentive effects of tournament compensation systems" Administrative Science Quarterly 37 (1992): 336–350.
- Brown, J. "Quitters never win: The (adverse) incentive effects of competing with superstars" Journal of Political Economy 119 (2011): 982–1013.
- Brown, M. P., Sturman, M. C., Simmering, M. J. "Compensation policy and organizational performance: The efficiency, operational, and financial implications of pay levels and pay structure" Academy of Management Journal 46 (2003): 752–762.
- Cason, T. N., Masters, W. A., Sheremeta, R. M. "Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study" Journal of Public Economics 94 (2010): 604–611.
- Cason, T. N., Sheremeta, R. M., Zhang, J. "Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games" Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012): 26–43.
- Cason, T. N., Sheremeta, R. M., Zhang, J. Asymmetric and Endogenous Communication in Competition between Groups Working Paper, 2015.
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- Chen, Z. C., Ong, D., Sheremeta, R. M. "The gender difference in the value of winning" Economics Letters 137 (2015): 226–229.
- Chen, Z. C., Ong, D., Sheremeta, R. M. Competition between and within Universities: Theoretical and Experimental Investigation of Group Identity and the Desire to Win Working Paper, 2016.
- Chowdhury, S. M., Gürtler, O. "Sabotage in contests: A survey" Public Choice 164 (2015): 135–155.
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- Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., Sheremeta, R. M. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments" Experimental Economics 18 (2015): 609–669.
- Deck, C., Sheremeta, R. M. "Fight or flight? Defending against sequential attacks in the game of siege" Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (2012): 1069–1088.
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- Gill, D., Prowse, V. "A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition" American Economic Review 102 (2012): 469–503.
- Green, J. R., Stokey, N. "A comparison of tournaments and contracts" Journal of Political Economy 91 (1983): 349–364.
- Heffernan, M. A Bigger Prize: Why Competition isn’t Everything and How we do Better. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014.
- Helper, S., Kleiner, M. M., Wang, Y. Analyzing Compensation Methods in Manufacturing: Piece Rates, Time Rates, or Gain-Sharing? Working Paper, 2010.
- Hirshleifer, J., Riley, J. G. Elements of the Theory of Auctions and Contests Working Paper, 1978.
- Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P. "Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design" Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 7 (1991): 24–52.
- Kimbrough, E. O., Sheremeta, R. M. "Side-payments and the costs of conflict" International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013): 278–286.
- Kimbrough, E. O., Sheremeta, R. M. "Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict" Journal of Peace Research 51 (2014): 487–500.
- Kimbrough, E. O., Sheremeta, R. M., Shields, T. W. "When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 99 (2014): 96–108.
- Knoeber, C. R. "A real game of chicken: Contracts, tournaments, and the production of broilers" Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5 (1989): 271–292.
- Knoeber, C. R., Thurman, W. N. "Testing the theory of tournaments: An empirical analysis of broiler production" Journal of Labor Economics 12 (1994): 155–179.
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- Laffont, J. J., Martimort, D. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Llorente-Saguer, A., Sheremeta, R. M., Szech, N. How to Design Contests between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions Working Paper, 2016.
- Lynch, J. G., Zax, J. S. "The rewards to running prize structure and performance in professional road racing" Journal of Sports Economics 1 (2000): 323–340.
- Mago, S. D., Savikhin, A. C., Sheremeta, R. M. "Facing your opponents: Social identification and information feedback in contests" Journal of Conflict Resolution 60 (2016): 459–481.
- Mago, S. D., Sheremeta, R. M., Yates, A. "Best-of-three contest experiments: Strategic versus psychological momentum" International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013): 287–296.
- Maloney, M. T., McCormick, R. E. "The response of workers to wages in tournaments: Evidence from foot races" Journal of Sports Economics 1 (2000): 99–123.
- Moldovanu, B., Sela, A. "The optimal allocation of prizes in contests" American Economic Review 91 (2001): 542–558.
- Müller, W., Schotter, A. "Workaholics and dropouts in organizations" Journal of the European Economic Association 8 (2010): 717–743.
- Nalebuff, B. J., Stiglitz, J. E. "Prizes and incentives: Towards a general theory of compensation and competition" Bell Journal of Economics 14 (1983): 21–43.
- Niederle, M., Vesterlund, L. "Gender and competition" Annual Review of Economics 3 (2011): 601–630.
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- Preston, I., Szymanski, S. "Cheating in contests" Oxford Review of Economic Policy 19 (2003): 612–624.
- Price, C. R., Sheremeta, R. M. "Endowment effects in contests" Economics Letters 111 (2011): 217–219.
- Price, C. R., Sheremeta, R. M. "Endowment origin, demographic effects and individual preferences in contests" Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 24 (2015): 597–619.
- Rosen, S. "Authority, control, and the distribution of earnings" Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1982): 311–323.
- Rubin, J., Sheremeta, R. "Principal-agent settings with random shocks" Management Science 62 (2016): 985–999.
- Rubin, J., Samek, A. S., Sheremeta, R. M. Incentivizing Quantity and Quality of Output: An Experimental Investigation of the Quantity-Quality Trade-Off Working Paper, 2016.
- Sattinger, M. "Assignment models of the distribution of earnings" Journal of Economic Literature 31 (1993): 831–880.
- Schotter, A., Weigelt, K. "Asymmetric tournaments, equal opportunity laws, and affirmative action: Some experimental results" Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (1992): 511–539.
- Schurr, A., Ritov, I. "Winning a competition predicts dishonest behavior" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113 (2016): 1754–1759.
- Sheremeta, R. M. "Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests" Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2010): 731–747.
- Sheremeta, R. M. "Contest design: An experimental investigation" Economic Inquiry 49 (2011): 573–590.
- Sheremeta, R. M. "Behavioral dimensions of contests" In: Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L. (eds). Companion to Political Economy of Rent Seeking. London: Edward Elgar, 2015.
- Sheremeta, R. M. Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research Working Paper, 2015.
- Sheremeta, R. M., Zhang, J. "Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?" Social Choice and Welfare 35 (2010): 175–197.
- Sheremeta, R. M., Masters, W. A., Cason, T. N. Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: Theory and Experimental Results Working Paper, 2013.
- Shupp, R., Sheremeta, R. M., Schmidt, D., Walker, J. "Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence" Journal of Economic Psychology 39 (2013): 257–267.
- Sutter, M., Strassmair, C. "Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments—An experimental study" Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009): 506–525.
- Szech, N. "Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions" Games and Economic Behavior 92 (2015): 138–149.
- Szymanski, S. "The economic design of sporting contests" Journal of Economic Literature 41 (2003): 1137–1187.
- Taylor, E. Z. "The effect of incentives on knowledge sharing in computer‐mediated communication: An experimental investigation" Journal of Information Systems 20 (2006): 103–116.
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- Weigelt, K., Dukerich, J., Schotter, A. "Reactions to discrimination in an incentive pay compensation scheme: A game-theoretic approach" Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 44 (1989): 26–44.
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- Wu, S. Y., Roe, B., Sporleder, T. Mixed Tournaments, Common Shocks, and Disincentives: An Experimental Study Working Paper, 2006.