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References for Is high-skilled migration harmful to tax systems’ progressivity?
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Further reading
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Key references
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Lehmann, E., Simula, L., Trannoy, A. "Tax me if you can!
Optimal non-linear income tax between competing
governments." Quarterly Journal
of Economics 129:4 (2014): 1995–2030. Key reference: [1]
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Grogger, J., Hanson, G. H. "Income
maximization and the selection and sorting of international
migrants." Journal of
Development Economics 95:1 (2011): 42–57. Key reference: [2]
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Ganong, P., Shoag, D. "Why has regional
income convergence in the US declined?" Journal of Urban
Economics 102 (2017): 76–90. Key reference: [3]
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Roller, M., Schmidheiny, K. Tax-induced
Household Mobility: Evidence from Intra-City Income Tax
Variation. Working
Paper, 2017-06. Key reference: [4]
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Young, C., Varner, C. "Millionaire
migration and state taxation of top incomes: Evidence from a
natural experiment." National Tax
Journal 64:2 (2011): 255–284. Key reference: [5]
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Agrawal, D. R., Foremny, D. Relocation of the
Rich: Migration in Response to Top Tax Rate Changes from Spanish
Reforms. Working
Paper No.3740, 2016-06. Key reference: [6]
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Kleven, H. J., Landais, C., Saez, E. "Taxation and
international migration of superstars: evidence from the
European football market." American Economic
Review 103:5 (2013): 1892–1924. Key reference: [7]
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Kleven, H. J., Landais, C., Saez, E., Schultz, E. A. "Migration and wage
effects of taxing top Earners: Evidence from the foreigners’ tax
scheme in Denmark." Quarterly Journal
of Economics 129:1 (2014): 333–378. Key reference: [8]
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Piketty, T., Saez, E. "Optimal labor
income taxation." In: Auerbach, A. J., Chetty, R., Feldstein, M., Saez, E. (eds). Handbook of Public
Economics. Volume 5. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2013. Key reference: [9]
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Bénassy-Quéré, A., Trannoy, A., Wolff, G. Tax Harmonization
in Europe: Moving Forward. Les Notes du
Conseil d’Analyse Économique No.14, 2014-07. Key reference: [10]
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Lindert, P. H. The Rise and
Future of Progressive Redistribution. Commitment to
Equity (CEQ) Institute Working Paper No.73, 2017. Key reference: [11]
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Brewer, M., Saez, E., Shephard, A. "Means-testing and
tax rates on earnings." In: Adam, S., Besley, T., Blundell, R., Bond, S., Chote, R., Gammie, M., Johnson, P., Myles, G., Poterba , J. M. (eds). Dimensions of Tax
Design: The Mirrlees Review. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Key reference: [12]
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Borjas, G. J. "The economic
analysis of immigration." In: Ashenfelter, O. C., Card, D. (eds). Handbook of Labor
Economics. Volume 3. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1999. Key reference: [13]
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Lehmann, E., Simula, L., Trannoy, A. "Tax me if you can!
Optimal non-linear income tax between competing
governments." Quarterly Journal
of Economics 129:4 (2014): 1995–2030.
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Additional References
- Barro, R. J., Sala-I-Martin, X., Blanchard, O. J., Hall, R. E. "Convergence across states and regions." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1991:1 (1991): 107–182.
- Liebig, T., Puhani, P. A., Sousa-Poza, A. "Taxation and internal migration—Evidence from the Swiss census using community-level variation in income tax rates." Journal of Regional Science 47:4 (2007): 807–836.
- Mirrlees, J. A. "An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation." Review of Economic Studies 38:2 (1971): 175–208.
- Rochet, J. C., Stole, L. A. "Nonlinear pricing with random participation." Review of Economic Studies 69:1 (2002): 277–311.
- Simula, L., Trannoy, A. "Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective." Social Choice and Welfare 39:4 (2012): 751–782.