Authors

Irina Denisova

  • Current position:
    Assistant Professor of Economics, NES; Lead Economist, CEFIR
  • Research interest:
    Labor markets and social policy in transition economies, microeconomics of unemployment, effectiveness of active labor market programs, income distribution, poverty and inequality, social and labor market effects of WTO accession, economics of education
  • Website:
    http://www.nes.ru/en/people/catalog/d/idenisova
  • Affiliations:
    New Economic School and CEFIR, Russian Federation
  • Qualifications:
    PhD Economics, University of Manchester, 1998
  • Personal statement about IZA World of Labor:
    I find the project an inspired way to inform policymakers and broad public on recent academic developments related to economic policy
  • Selected publications:
    • “Recent demographic developments in the Russian Federation.” In: Alexeev, M., and S. Weber (eds). Handbook of the Russian Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming (with I. Denisova and J. Shapiro).
    • “Everyone hates privatization, but why? Survey evidence from 28 post-communist countries.” Journal of Comparative Economics 40:1 (2012): 44–61 (with E. Zhuravskaya, T. Frye, and M. Eller).
    • “Adult mortality in Russia: A microanalysis.” Economics of Transition 18:2 (2010): 333–363.
    • “What do Russians think about transition?” Economics of Transition 18:2 (2010): 249–280 (with E. Zhuravskaya and M. Eller).
    • “Who wants to revise privatization? The complementarity of market skills and institutions.” American Political Science Review 103:2 (2009): 284–304 (with E. Zhuravskaya, T. Frye, and M. Eller).
  • Articles

Institutions and the support for market reforms

A combination of individual self-interest and good institutions determines the level of public support for market reforms

May 2016

10.15185/izawol.258 258

by Irina Denisova Denisova, I

Economic self-interest and social considerations are the key determinants of public support for market reforms in transition countries. However, political strategies that rely mainly on public support for pushing through economic reforms have limited relevance if the prevailing institutional environment is weak or corrupt. Poor governance and under-developed democracy significantly reduce the level of support. A good institutional framework allows the potential gains from reforms to be realized in a beneficial way, while corruption and poor governance deny the prospect of gains for individuals and for society.